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Introduction 
George Washington's sentiments on the obligations of citizens 
were clear. He regarded military service as the duty of every male 
citizen who enjoyed the privileges of democracy. He stressed that 
an army composed of citizen-soldiers was preferable, from a point 
of social cohesion and political stability, to one composed of 
professional soldiers - and cited the swiss Army as the proper 
example (Graham, 1971). 
In spite of these perceived benefits, the United States has 
historically been of two minds with respect to providing for the 
national defense. That is, should the military be composed of 
professional soldiers, induced to enlist by opportunity cost 
differentials or a taste for military service? Or should the 
military consist in large part of citizen-soldiers responding to a 
national obligation - in much the same manner as citizens called 
for jury duty (Lacey, 1982)? The national response to security 
threats has reflected this dichotomy. From the Civil War to World 
War II, the government periodically relied on conscription to 
augment a small, professional army. In the aftermath of World war 
II, the draft apparatus was dismantled, only to be quickly 
reconstructed with the onset of the Cold War. For the next twenty­
five years conscription (and draft-induced enlistments) provided a 
substantial portion of our armed forces; spreading the military 
experience over a large segment of the young, male population. 
Given the necessity for maintaining a large military presence over 
an protracted period, the draft came to be viewed as a reasonable 
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demand of citizenship. It remained for an unpopular war and a 
unfairly selective draft to dim the values of a broader military 
experience. 
Gates Commission 
In 1970, the Gates Commission was convened by President Nixon 
to consider the abolition of an increasingly unpopular draft. The 
Gates Commission found the draft to be arbitrary and discriminatory 
in its burden; a "tax" neither universally borne, nor one with an 
equal probability of being borne by different segments of the 
population (Report. 1970). The draft was viewed as inequitable and 
an all volunteer service (AVS) as preferable, particularly from the 
perspective of applied economic theory. Thus, for the past twenty 
years, the US military has been an all-volunteer service 
The issue is not whether to reinstate conscription; for all 
purposes the draft is extinct. The issue at hand is whether 
society is better when a smaller percentage of its membership 
experiences military training. Did the staff economists who had 
substantial input into the final Gates Report err in their cost­
benefit analysis? Specifically, were the social benefits of 
military service understated in the cost-benefit analysis? The 
paper proposes that they indeed were. 
Much of the economic argument which supported the abolition of 
conscription cited the "tax" of the draft; broadly defined as 
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coercion, evasion, and collection costs, a military wage less than 
the reservation wage, and lower lifetime earnings. Furthermore, 
opponents of the draft noted that the draft tax was arbitrary, 
regressive, and shouldered disproportionately by minorities. Today, 
in the absence of a draft and the presence of a pay scale which 
more accurately reflects civilian opportunity costs, the tax of 
military service becomes negative. 
The Economics of Voluntarism 
From an economic perspective, "voluntarism" implies that each 
man or woman who chooses to join the military bears no implicit 
tax; i.e. receives a military wage which, at the very least, is 
equal to his or her opportunity cost in the civilian sector at the 
time of enlistment. If the distaste for military service is very 
high, then so is one's reservation wage. As the enlistment 
proceeds, it is conceivable a particular occupation might become 
onerous, raising the reservation wage above the military wage. 
However, well-laid career and promotional tracks plus shorter 
enlistment periods minimize this potential cost. If the military 
wage rises (ceteris paribus) more individuals will volunteer their 
labor services as their reservation wage is met. As the military 
wage structure is uniform and set by law, anyone who selects to 
enlist has perfect information about the starting wage and earns an 
economic rent. 
Removal of the draft (and the costs of coercion) occasioned an 
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increase in individual (and social) benefits accruing to the 
military experience. On the other hand, since 1973, traffic 
through the military has been reduced as the composition of the 
military becomes more careerist and less citizen-soldier in nature. 
Accordingly, the military experience is spread over a smaller 
segment of society, reducing the social benefits of a broader 
military experience. In the absense of conscription, the costs of 
individual service have been lowered as have the benefits of a 
broader participation. The post-Cold War downsizing of the 
military will further reduce the element of military experience in 
us society. The paper proposes that a broader, short term 
exposure to military training would be a Pareto superior move for 
society. 
Benefits Accruing to a Broader Military Experience 
The paper proposes that society benefits in two ways from a 
more diffused military experience. First, service personnel 
undertake both general and military-specific training which build 
human capital and improve post-service productivity. Second, 
society benefits directly as military service becomes common to a 
greater percentage of its population. Social cohesiveness is 
enhanced as more citizens of diverse social groups share a common 
denominator of military training. Military training spread over a 
greater portion of society results in a greater proliferation of 
socially desireable attributes such as discipline, responsibility, 
and adaptability. 
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In order to affect a wider dispersion of service-attendant 
social benefits, the paper proposes a mechanism by which greater 
numbers of the post-high school youthful cohort (18-20) can 
undertake military training for a brief, twelve month period and 
then phase back into civilian life. Military service during this 
period might be optimal for those without established career goals 
or distaste for military service. Certainly, opportunity costs 
during the immediate post-high school period would be minimized. 
Therefore, the focus of the paper is to: (1) consider evidence 
of the distinctive human and social capital generated by the 
military experience; (2) propose how production of this service­
specific capital can be encouraged through shorter periods of 
enlistment and a more widespread military experience; and, (3) 
examine a reward structure for the new voluntary military training 
program. It is further suggested that this new infusion of short 
term active duty military personnel will be cost-efficient and not 
detrimental to the military mission. Finally, through careful 
structuring of the post-service benefits package, human and social 
capital can be further stimulated through subsidized post-military 
training and education. 
HUman and Social Capital Generation in the Military 
The distinction between human and social capital development 
is a tenuous one, but one that must be attempted for the sake of 
greater clarity. The author proposes that human capital 
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development, in making the recruit more productive, directly 
rewards the acquirer with higher income, and indirectly benefits 
the greater society; e.g. more productive labor resources may lower 
costs, increase innovation, and raise incomes. Social capital 
generation refers to characteristics inculcated, fostered, and 
honed by the military experience that result in social benefits of 
an approximately equal incremental nature for all citizens; e. g. a 
more tolerant, civic-minded, and law abiding society as the result 
of a broader military experience. It is further proposed that both 
human and social capital are a joint product of the military 
experience. 
Changes in Technological Content of Military Skills and systems: 
The military service of the 1990s is substantially different 
than the military of the 1980s and of the 1970s from a perspective 
of technological content. Since the end of the Korean War, the 
percentage of military manpower trained in traditional infantryman 
skills has declined in favor of technology-oriented skills. In 
1945, white collar labor made up 28% of the military work force 
compared to 47% .j..n 1985 (Binkin, 1986). Calculated on a percentage 
of total cost biasis, the electronic content of weapons systems 
increased from 10 to 20 percent in the 1950's, to 20 to 30 percent 
by the early l970's, to 40% by 1983 (Binkin, 1986). In 1945, only 
6% of armed f'orces enlisted personnel were categorized as 
electronic technicians. By 1985, this percentage had increased to 
21% of military enlisted personnel (Binkin, 1986, p. 7-8). This 
technological transformation of the military, plus 
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the 
civilianization of some of the more mundane jobs (food service) 
insures that even the least educated recruits will enjoy some real 
level of human capital enhancement. 
Magnum and Ball (1989) focused on the tranferability of 
military training to civilian occupations in veterans of the post­
draft period. They found a transferablity rate (45%-50%) for 
military acquired skills to civilian employment, a higher rate than 
previously hypothesized. It is probable that the higher rate is 
attributable for improved individual choice in both enlistment and 
military career field decisions. Furthermore, the 50% skill 
transferability rate was equal to that achieved in civilian 
occupational training. 
It is possible and indeed probable that military experience 
allows the relative poor and unskilled a level of general training 
that could not be realized in civilian entry level positions, 
training which would could not be undertaken at the individual's 
own expense. It should be noted that military downsizing and 
reduced opportunity costs in the civilian sector have allowed the 
military to tighten enlistment standards and thereby raise, rather 
than lower, the ladder of social mobility for the least endowed. 
However, lower civilian wage expectations have made military 
service a viable alternative for the better endowed youthful 
cohort, particularly among minorities and females. 
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The "Bridging" Effect and Military Service 
Martindale and Poston (1979} consider the "bridging" effect 
that military service has in channeling youth, and, in particular, 
minorities into the socioeconomic mainstream, and the subsequent 
positive impact on post-service income. In examining the earnings 
of World War II, Korean War, and Vietnam veterans relative to their 
nonveteran cohorts, the authors find a positive correlation between 
civilian earnings and prior military experience. Furthermore, the 
weight of the evidence is particularly strong for minorities 
(African-Americans and Mexican-Americans), suggesting that the 
military serves as an effective instrument of socioeconomic 
mobility. 
Little and Fredland (1979) reach essentially the same 
conclusions from a different database. Employing disaggregated 
data from the National Longitudinal Survey on the 1966 earnings of 
men aged 45 to 66, they find that military service has a positive 
influence on civilian earnings fifteen to twenty years after 
discharge. Specifically, white veterans, averaged across 
characteristic groups, earned incomes 5%-10% greater than their 
nonveteran cohort, while non-white (Hispanic) and black veterans 
earned 13% -15% more than their nonveteran counterparts. For 
whites, this increment is equivalent to the return on a year's 
additional education or four to seven added years of job tenure. 
For African-Americans, the service-determined increase is worth two 
to three years added schooling or seven extra years of job tenure. 
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Furthermore, the study shows that white veterans averaged one more 
year of post-military training than their nonveteran counterpart, 
while minority veterans averaged two and one-half more years of 
formal education than their nonveteran counterpart (Little and 
Fredland, 1979). 
There is a strong correlation between the existence of GI 
Educational Bill rights and the attainment of additional education. 
In turn, incremental training is positively correlated with income. 
The evidence presented by Little and Fredland (1979) suggests that 
military service may have a positive effect on life cycle income. 
Thus, the "tax" of a functioning draft, may have been overstated. 
Furthermore, the nature and extent of Vietnam GI Bill benefits may 
help explain the post-service earnings gap of Vietnam veterans 
relative to their Korean and Second World War counterparts. As 
benefits under the Vietnam GI Bill of Rights were less extensive 
than their predecessors, Vietnam veterans were less apt to 
undertake post-service training or enrolled for a shorter period. 
Consequently, Vietnam veterans earned smaller returns on a smaller 
investment. 
The Veteran's Premium 
Many of the studies which considered the burden and benefits 
of military service were conducted in the 1970s, the general period 
of conversion from a draft-augmented force to the all volunteer 
system. Because of the time frame, the research tended to 
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concentrate on the perceived short run net costs accruing to 
military service. Later, Angrist (1990) focuses on the veteran 
within a ten year aftermath of discharge. The common thread 
linking most of the analyses conducted under the Gates commission 
was that the draft imposed real costs on draftees and coerced 
enlistees that were not offset by benefits. The Gates Commission 
was, in fact, an economic study of the feasibility of an all­
volunteer force to replace a draft-augmented one. The Commission 
considered objections to the AVS, including its potential lack of 
representativeness and negative effect on the social fabric. 
However, it concluded that the tax of the draft was a most 
inefficient one and that the country would be better served by a 
volunteer service, manned through the workings of a free labor 
marketplace (Segal, 1989). Furthermore, the Commission took a 
decidedly short run focus in its cost benefit analysis which tended 
to bias its findings in favor of the AVS. 
A countervailing body of research suggests a secular and 
positive divergence between veteran and non-veteran earnings paths. 
In the shorter run, the differential may be positive or negative 
depending on the time frame over which veterans' earnings are 
considered. One possible explanation of the variation in findings 
between short run (lower incomes for Vietnam era veterans) and long 
run (higher incomes for veterans in general) is that Vietnam 
veterans may have entered a decidedly different labor market than 
their World War II counterparts. 
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Magnum and Ball (1989) combed the National Longitudinal Survey 
data for evidence on the civilian sector earnings of post-draft era 
veterans. They found, as did studies of World War II and Korean 
War veterans, that an earnings premium for veterans did in fact 
exist, and surfaced within two years after entering civilian 
employment. Their findings add credence to the view of the 
Vietnam experience as an outlier - one inconsistent with the 
history of the military as a documented generator of human capital. 
Also, as many of the studies of Vietnam veterans consider 
post-service earnings in the relatively short post-discharge 
period, the premium attributable to veteran status may not yet have 
revealed itself, particularly in the case of initial entry into an 
adverse labor market (DeTray, 1982; Little and Fredland, 1979). 
Were the premium lagged until the veteran's early middle age before 
exerting itself, lifetime earnings, even when discounted, outweigh 
any short-run costs. The author concurs with Schwartz (1986) in 
viewing any negative impact on post-service earnings as a 
"particular feature of the Vietnam war. " It follows that, in the 
absense of a Vietnam conflict, the draft, and coerced military 
service and in the presence of higher military pay scales and a 
technologically intensified armed services, any cost-benefit 
analysis of the military experience will swing toward the (more) 
positive. 
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The question for economists becomes, why does the premium 
occur? The literature generally attributes the post-service wage 
premium to two sources: (1) differences in human capital investment 
by veterans and non-veterans; and, (2) employers• use of veteran 
status as a screening device (De Tray, 1982). 
Human capital and Credentialism 
To test the hypothesis that the effect of military service on 
civilian wages is positively related to the veteran component of 
any group, DeTray (1982) draws data from the 1960 and 1970 Census 
Public Use Samples. The resulting evidence seems to �orroborate 
his hypothesis of a positive correlation between veteran status and 
private sector wage. While some of the wage differential is 
attributable to general human capital acquired from military­
specific training, and subsequent, government-financed training 
post-military service, Detray assigns a significant part of the 
difference to the reality that employers use veteran status as a 
credential - an effective means of screening job q.pplicants. 
Veteran status provides a vacancy filling firm with tnformation 
that the applicant has been pre-screened by the military. That is, 
the veteran has passed sufficient tests to be accepted by the 
military, designated as qualified, and honorably disc4arged from 
the performance of his or her duties. 
signal employers that the applicant 
Veteran status, then, may 
has a proven level of 
productivity, while the non-veteran lacks that credentia:1; enabling 
a higher wage for the veteran (Little and Fredland, 1979). 
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Unique Social Capital 
The concept of a purely social capital, uniquely generated by 
a broader exposure to military training, constitutes an intangible 
which evades attempts at quantification. Nonetheless, there is 
support that such capital does exist and is produced through 
military service. A broader military experience is seen by Charles 
Moskos (1982) and Moskos and Faris (1982) as consistent with 
increased participation of society in the requirements of democracy 
and the creation of a common denominator of shared experience for 
a greater cross-section of society. A greater diffusion of 
military service is also viewed as increasing the production of the 
characteristics of discipline, responsibility, and social order -
which would tend to strengthen the cohesiveness of a society. A 
military that is more representative of the greater society, in 
that a larger segment of the civilian population has undergone 
military training, would tend to be less alienated from that 
society. Inversely, a broader military experience would result in 
a military that is more reflective of widely held social values. 
Finally, a larger "pass-through" military service by the larger 
society would create a greater awareness of military efficiency and 
help to establish real constraints against redundant programs and 
personnel. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville (1877) describes 
the benefits, for the military and the greater society, of the 
citiz�n soldier: 
Among democratic nations the private soldiers remain most like 
�:ivilians; upon them the habits of the nation have the firmest 
hold, and public opinion the most influence. It is by the 
instrumentality of the private soldier especially that it may 
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be possible to infuse into a democratic army the love of 
freedom and the respect of rights, if these principles have 
once been inculcated on the people at large. The reverse 
happens among aristocratic nations, where the soldiery have 
eventually nothing in common with their fellow-citizens and 
where they live among them as strangers, and often as enemies. 
New Military Enlistment option 
It is proposed that a new enlistment option be extended to 
young men and women, 18-20 years old. The year or two following 
high school is viewed as the transition period between youth and 
adulthood and a time for reassessment. Accordingly, it is in this 
period where the opportunity costs of military service are lower 
than at any other stage of the life cycle. The new enlistment 
option entails an active duty commitment of twelve months, with 
additional active or reserve service at the option of the recruit 
and the respective services. 
It is expected that the nature of military training will be a 
mix of general (the first six months) and civilian occupation 
specific (the last six months). Knapp (1973) suggests that aspects 
of general training such as "discipline, ability to get along with 
others, and good citizenship, " are as positively correlated with 
higher civilian earnings as is occupation-specific training. 
Knapp proceeds to note that the "burden" of military service. 
becomes more negative (less than zero dollars) when the military 
training is undertaken at lower ages, levels of education, 
and periods of enlistment. 
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In 1990, the first term enlistment accessions of the four 
services totaled 217, 000 personnel. It is proposed that, 
initially, the new option add 100, 000 recruits to the mill tary 
services; incrementing each service in proportion to the 1990 first 
term enlistments of each branch as a percentage of total accessions 
(Army 39%, Navy 29%, Air Force 17%, Marine Corps 15%) • The 
increase of new accessions by 50% should not affect service mission 
capability nor strain existing facilities. New accessions as a 
percentage of total force strength would increase modestly, from 
10. 6 % to 15. 5%. It is further proposed that the 100, 000 force 
increment be raised gradually to a ceiling of 200,000 (US Bureau of 
the Census, 1992). 
As an integral part of the new enlistment option, 
participants, upon successful completion of duty tours, will be 
guaranteed a low interest student loan to continue their tr�ining 
or education. Initially, the maximum loan to each student would be 
limited to $10, 000. This ceiling would be adjusted upward by the 
average annual increase in higher education costs. 
Implementation of such an option will benefit society and the 
military in three ways. First, it will spread the military 
experience over a greater cross-section of society, increasing the 
representativeness of the military and expanding the common 
denominator of military service, thereby strengthening the social 
fabric. Second, the new enlistment option, through active duty and 
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post-military training and education will act to enhance the human 
capital stock of the youthful (18-20) cohort and allow a secular 
flow of return on investment. Finally, such a program will act to 
augment the reserves at a critical juncture in time. Under the 
Total Force policy, reservists have a greatly expanded role in 
maintaining the nation I s security (Binkin and Kaufman, 1989). 
Reservists are now a major part of any initial deployment of combat 
troops. The role of the reserves will increase rather than shrink 
as the active military services are downsized as part of the post­
Cold War, deficit reduction package. 
Summary 
Military service is a proven developer of human and social 
capital. The thrust of the literature is that World War II and 
Korean veterans enjoy a civilian earnings premium associated with 
military service. There is no evidence yet of a positive income 
differential attributable to Vietnam-era duty. Indeed, much of the 
literature associates a negative post-service earnings differential 
with Vietnam-era service. The Vietnam era period may be considered 
an outlier, in terms of unique economic conditions, characteristics 
of Vietnam-era veterans, lower levels of post-service educational 
benefits and possible discrimination against veterans by employers. 
More recently in the post-draft period, (Magnum and Ball, 1989) 
when the AVS is sampled, the earnings premium turns positive again. 
In 1993, President Clinton's National Service proposal was 
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enacted with the expressed purpose of creating civic awareness and 
instilling a sense of social responsibility in young people. The 
author contends that we have a viable means of gaining such ends in 
place - the US Armed Forces. A brief period of enlistment, spread 
across a greater cross section of the youthful cohort, could 
achieve many of the same goals targeted by National Service in a 
more cost efficient manner. 
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